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Equity Participation In Real Estate Finance
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history lenders have sought to maximize their profits
from the sums loaned. This has become increasingly necessary in
recent years as the inflationary spiral has rooted itself in the American
economy. The problem could be easily solved by raising interest rates
as the prices of goods and services rise, except that virtually every state
in the union has enacted some form of usury statute limiting the
maximum rate of interest that can be charged.' The result of this is
that the prime rate has, of late, surpassed that rate allowed by many
states.2 One need not strain the imagination to conclude that lenders
are reluctant to do business when the prime rate is at 11 or 12 percent,
while the legal maximum is at 8 or 10 percent. Under these circum-
stances lenders have been compelled to seek out new ways of using
their funds while avoiding the dire effects of usury.8 One such tech-
nique which has come into vogue is equity participation. Though the
concept is not new,4 it has been only intermittently used until the last
"credit crunch." It has manifested itself in a variety of devices, three
of which will be discussed in this writing. They are: sale and leaseback;
loan agreements for a share of the profits; and ownership participation.
These are selected because of their wide-spread appeal, and their con-
tinued use even after interest rates have begun to recede.5
The purpose of this writing is to examine each of the devices listed
above, and to synthesize the criteria and the rules the courts have em-
ployed, in determining whether a given transaction violates the usury
statutes. The discussion proceeds in three parts as follows: (1) the el-
ements of usury and the courts' .approach; (2) sale and leaseback; and
(3) profit participation.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF USURY AND THE COURT'S APPROACH
Whenever usury is at issue, the courts look for four distinguishing
characteristics. The presence of these elements is conclusive of the
1. Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 A.B.A. REAL
PROP., PROB. & TRusr J. 315 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Hershman).
2. Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light Tight Money Market,
27 MD, L. R~v. 1 (1967).
3. The penalties for usury are quite harsh, ranging from a money penalty (as much
as triple the amount of interest) to providing that the lender cannot make any contract
in the state. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-4 and § 24-8; ARK. STAT. 1947 Ann., §§
1201, 1202 (1966 Rpl.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 303.20 (1947).
4. Hall v. Daggett, 6 Cow. 653 (N.Y. 1827).
5. Hershman at 320.
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issue, while the absence of one or more is clearly an absolute defense to
the charge. 6 These elements are generally articulated as, (1) a loan of
money or something of value or the forebearance of enforcing a loan of
money or collecting a thing of value, (2) an agreement between the
parties that the principal shall be repayable in any event, (3) the re-
ceipt of more profit than is authorized by law, and (4) intent to violate
the usury law."
In attempting to discern the presence or absence of these elements, the
courts have declared that they will look beyond the form of the transac-
tion to its substance. 8 Thus, when the courts review a sale and lease-
back under a claim that a loan was really intended, they look, not at the
form of the transaction, but at all its provisions and the circumstances as
they existed at the time the deal was consumated. For instance in such
a transaction the court would certainly determine whether there was an
obligation to repurchase, 9 or whether the selling price and the term of
the lease forced repurchase." ° If the answer is yes to either of these
queries, then the second element is present.
Some mention must be made of the process by which interest is
calculated. It is not computed each year, and measured against the
statute. Rather, one must determine the total amount to be paid over
the life of the transaction, and compare that sum to the rate allowed by
statute. Thus, a particular transaction may call for an excessive amount
of interest in the early years of its term so long as the total amount paid,
averaged over the life of the loan, is within the ceiling. 1 This is often a
difficult task when future profits are the measure.
The most important consideration that the courts have, however, is
the intent of the parties. Reference is not made to the last element listed
supra, namely, intent to violate the law, for if the other elements are
found the court will presume the last. 12 Rather, reference is made to
the parties' intent to enter into a lender-borrower relationship. The
courts take great pains to determine the intent of the parties, including
their actions before and after the transaction, 13 the financial condition of
6. See, e.g., Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d
823 (1971); Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
7. 55 Am. JUR. Usury § 12 (1946).
8. See, e.g., Houghton v. Burden, 228 U.S. 161 (1913); Brown v. Robinson, 224
N.Y. 301, 120 N.E. 694 (1918); Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180
S.E.2d 823 (1971); Deming Invest. Co. v. Giddens, 41 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931).
9. Golden State Lanes v. Fox, 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1965).
10. Hershman at 320.
11. Hershman.
12. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 475 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Wileken, 142 Cal. App. 2d 246, 298 P.2d 147 (1956).
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the borrower,1 4 and the amount of consideration paid for the equity
position taken.15 In sum, the courts scrutinize every relevant piece of
evidence in determining whether the parties intended the transaction to
be a loan.' 6 One would not be entirely candid, however, without
further noting that courts have historically been reluctant to disregard
the form of any transaction without substantial proof.' 7  The courts
seem to proceed under the notion that where a transaction is susceptible
of two interpretations, one that is legal and the other that is illegal, then
they will presume that the parties intended to remain within the law.1 s
III. SALE AND LEASEBACK
The sale and leaseback involves the transfer of a fee interest in the
property affected with the investor simultaneously leasing the land
and/or buildings back to the former owner. There are a number of
reasons why a land owner may desire such an arrangement, including tax
advantages and leveraging in a small equity position.' 9  For instance,
where there are improvements on the land to be sold that have been
fully depreciated, the seller may receive substantial tax advantages by
selling the land at its fair market value and taking a leaseback. The
seller can deduct the rental payments while putting the capital received,
from the sale, to work in the business or in some other venture. Addi-
tional tax savings are realized by taking the capital gain tax on the sale
rather than paying taxes on the profits from operations, where the
improvements are fully depreciated. The investor's position is also
quite acceptable. He can virtually assure himself of the return on his
investment from the negotiated rentals. Furthermore, the investor may
wish to mortgage the purchased property at a rate less than the rental
payments, thus gaining leverage through the "spread" in rents and debt
service while reinvesting the proceeds of the loan. Finally, the investor
has the very real possibility of ending up with a piece of valuable
property.20
The above inducements also apply when the property is unimproved,
with the additional consideration for the seller-lessee that such a sale
may produce 100 percent financing of proposed improvements. Of
course, the purchaser-lessor is not averse to buying land and eventually
getting a building as a bonus at the end of the lease. 2'
14. See, e.g., Kawauchi v. Tabat, 49 Haw. 160, 413 P.2d 221 (1966).
15. See, Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
16. Wood v. Angeles Mesa Land Co., 120 Cal. App. 313, 7 P.2d 748 (1932).
17. Arch A. Edwards Post No. 252, Regular Veterans Assoc. v. Gould, 144 Colo.
334, 56 P.2d 908 (1960).
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It would not seem that the transactions set forth above, would run
afoul of usury laws. Admittedly the sale and leaseback provides a
financing device, but rent is not considered as interest. Thus, it is irrel-
evant to inquire as to the relationship the rents bear to the selling price
in determining whether more profit is being earned than is allowed by
law. Surely, if what has been set forth above were the extent of sale
and leaseback agreements, the usury inquiry could be laid to rest.
Alas, this is not the case.
Oftentimes either the investor-lessor or the seller-lessee will insist on a
repurchase provision. The question then arises as to whether what is
ostensibly a sale and leaseback is not in reality a loan.2" A sale
contemplates
... the transfer of the general or absolute interest in property as distin-
guished from a special property interest. A loan, on the other hand,
is the delivery of a sum of money to another under a contract to re-
turn at some future time an equivalent amount with or without an
additional sum agreed upon for its use ... 23
Therefore, if the lease contains a repurchase provision and that provi-
sion is obligatory, it may be found to be no more than a repayment and,
therefore, a loan. 24
On the other hand if the repurchase provision is optional the ques-
tion becomes decidedly more difficult. Whether such a provision will
be deemed to provide the same metamorphosis as its obligatory cousin
above, will depend upon the intent of the parties. "The factors em-
ployed in deriving the intent are:
(a) Whether the sales price of the property is substantially dispro-
portionate to the value at the time of the transaction;
(b) Whether -the economic realities would dictate exercise of the
option to repurchase."2 5
As to the first criteria, if the purchase price is substantially lower than
the fair market value of the property, the transaction takes on the
characteristics of a loan because failure to exercise the option will result
in a significant loss. In Kawauchi v. Tabata26 this point is dramatically
illustrated. The plaintiff, Kawauchi, held property upon which there
were mortgages totalling $70,000 that were about to be foreclosed.
Plaintiff had been unable to find refinancing and was desperate to retain
the property which was later appraised at $160,000. The evidence
adduced showed plaintiff was willing to sell the property for $90,000
22. Id. at 320.
23. Milana v. Credit Disc. Co., 27 Cal.2d 335, 339-340, 163 P.2d 869, 871 (1945).
24. Golden State Lanes v. Fox, 232 Cal. App.2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1965).
25. Hershman at 320.
26. 49 Haw. 160, 413 P.2d 221 (1966).
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if a repurchase provision was included in the leaseback agreement, and
that he offered to repurchase at a 30% premium, i.e., $27,000, and pay
5 % interest on the sale price and the bonus amounting to $117,-
000.27 The upshot of the negotiations was an agreement embodying
the offer set forth above with a lease for three years and a provision that
repurchase could be made any time prior to the expiration of the lease. 8
After the lease had expired without plaintiff exercising the option, he
brought suit to have the sale and leaseback adjudged a usurious loan.
The court closely examined the sales price and compared it to the
court-appraised value of the property noting that $70,000 of the sales
price was paid over to the court as satisfaction of the foreclosure
proceeding, but that the remaining $20,000 was later paid over a period
of time. Inquiry was also made into the negotiations preceding the sale
and the court referred to testimony given at trial to the effect that the
property was a steal at $90,000, and "that man must be crazy to want to
sell it for $90,000.' '29 Weight was also given to the fact that plaintiff
was in need of a specific sum of money which he had been unable to
procure through refinancing channels, and that defendants advanced
that amount plus the realtor's fee with a small additional sum which
plaintiff needed for improvements during the interim. The court con-
cluded that the substantially reduced sales price coupled with the im-
mediate need for funds clearly indicated that a loan was intended and
that the rentals and bonus on the repurchase price must be considered
to be interest.
A word of caution should be voiced here in regard to the weight to be
given the disparity between selling price and appraised value. Certainly,
advantageous property transactions occur daily, and one must remain
cognizant of this fact in asserting inadequacy of price as a basis for
finding that a loan was the true intendment of the parties. Assuredly,
the criterion is universally used but it is not conclusive.80
Indeed, there is a whole line of cases which hold that a deed given is
not a mortgage despite a disparity in fair market value and selling price.
It was held in Arch A. Edwards Post No. 252, Regular Veterans Assoc.
v. Gould,"' that the fact that the selling price was substantially less than
the original offer did not sustain the burden of proving a loan was
intended. Though the original offer was $210,000 and the price paid
27. Id. at 163, 413, P.2d at 224.
28. Id. at 165, 413 P.2d at 226.
29. Id. at 165, 413 P.2d at 225.
30. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1966) (The annotation deals with deed absolute as a
mortgage, and the role inadequate consideration plays in such a transaction. A strong
analogy can be drawn between the two transactions and the criteria employed in judging
each).
31. 144 Colo. 334, 356 P.2d 908 (1960).
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was $,72,214, the court found that more evidence was needed. The
standard of proof necessary to find that a mortgage was intended was
that of clear and convincing evidence. 2
An even more dramatic example is found in Hicks v. Hicks & Norris3
wherein plaintiff who had executed a deed to defendant in considera-
tion for defendant's mortgage of $1,244.32 and payment by defendant
of a second mortgage of $400, demanded the transaction was merely a
mortgage. The property was valued at between $2,000 and $2,500.
Furthermore, evidence at trial showed that the defendant-grantee had
executed an agreement to reconvey the property at the end of two
years. The court held that such proof standing alone was not sufficient
to show an intent to mortgage. 4
The lesson to be learned is that the court in reviewing a claim of
usury will scrutinize the total transaction, and though disproportionate
sales price is a factor to be weighed it is certainly not conclusive of the
issue. 5 The other major factor considered in determining the true intent
of the parties is whether the seller-lessee is compelled to repurchase
by the economic realities of the transaction. This factor often comes
into play in conjunction with the presence of disproportionate sales
price mentioned above. For instance, in a transaction where the
property has been sold for less than its true value and a short term lease
has been executed, the repurchase is virtually dictated in the absence of
an option to renew the lease.3 6 Any other decision would involve a loss
equal to the difference in the fair market value and the deflated selling
price. Similarly, if both parties understood that the seller-lessee intend-
ed to use a substantial portion of the funds from the sale to improve the
property, a comparatively short term lease without option to renew
would certainly make it incumbent upon the seller to repurchase, i.e.,
the economic realities would dictate exercise of the repurchase provision.
These situations present one with the rather obvious coercive choice of
either repurchasing the property or losing substantial sums of money,
i.e., pay off the loan or forfeit the equity. In Gaither v. Clark,3 7 the
court found that due to the economic realtities of the sale and leaseback
the device was used to disguise a usurious loan. There plaintiffs sold
400 acres of property and simultaneously took a lease for 99 years.
The selling price was $5,000, though appraisals showed the value to be
between $18,000 and $20,000. The rent was fixed at $600 per annum,
though it was later reduced to half that amount, and an option to
32. Id. at 336, 346 P.2d at 910.
33. 18 Md. 47 (1832).
34. Id. at 54.
35. Annot., supra note 30.
36. Hershman at 320.
37. 67 Md. 18, 8 A. 740 (1887).
6
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repurchase was given for three years from the date of sale. After
reviewing testimony which indicated that the plaintiff had been seeking
a loan prior to the sale, the court concluded that it was immaterial that
the transaction was given the form of a sale and lease.
The standard seems to be, though certainly not articulated in this
form, what a reasonably prudent businessman would expect the nature
of the transaction to be. Furthermore, the factors set forth here reflect
the maxim that equity abhors a forfeiture, and the cases in this area
certainly show a commitment by the courts to prevent a windfall to the
buyer where the facts reasonably support a finding that the parties really
intended a loan. Hard and fast principles cannot be laid down which
will insure a finding that a loan was intended, or that the transaction
represents a bona fide sale and leaseback. However, some general
suggestions can be made which would tend to sway the court toward
affirming the form of the transaction.
If an opportunity to repurchase is to be included, then certainly it
should not be obligatory.38 On the other hand, the optional repurchase
provision should not be short term, though the exact length will be
governed by the individual facts of the case. The lease need not be long
term, i.e., approaching the economic life of the property if improved,
but if it is short term renewal options should be granted. There should
not be a great disparity between the selling price and the appraised
value. Finally, the investor should indicate some interest in the proper-
ty as owner. He should pay the taxes, assume liability for assessments,
or at least join with the lessee in payment, and in general hold himself
out as the landlord.39
This writing should not be read as forecasting the demise of sale and
leaseback as a financing device. The cases which are cited to show a
given sale and leaseback overturned and held to be a loan are clear
examples of overreaching on behalf of the buyer-lessor. This is not to
say that in a given transaction the result would not have been different
had the buyer not insisted on such oppressive terms. It is certainly
within reason that an investor could reap the necessary profits to make
the venture feasible, even though those profits exceed the amount al-lowed for interest, if the transaction is not so easily viewed as a loan.
Research does not yield a case in which a sale and leaseback has been
held to be a subterfuge for a usurious loan merely because the rents
exceeded the rate at which money could be loaned, where the other
factors did not indicate a loan was intended. Of course, not all sellers
will be willing or able to pay higher rents, and some medium must be
38. See, 232 Cal. App.2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1965).
39. See, 49 Haw. 160, 413 P.2d 221 (1966).
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met by carefully adjusting each variable while maintaining a watchful
eye for provisions which would support a claim of usury.
Sale and leaseback offer a viable alternative in these times of increas-
ing money costs in the face of antiquated usury statutes.40 It provides
advantages for the seller, while returning a reasonable profit to the
buyer on the funds invested.
IV. PROFIT PARTICIPATION BY THE LENDER
A. Loan Agreements
The profit participation agreement is a device that has been success-
fully employed to return more profit than that otherwise allowed by
law.41 The basic element that must be maintained in each agreement is
the lender's willingness to subject part of his return to a contingency.
The lender's profit is made dependent upon the success or failure of the
venture financed by tying his return to the profits of the business. 2
These loan agreements are typically in four parts: (1) The lender allows
the borrower use of the money for a specified business venture or
transaction; (2) the borrower agrees to repay the principal of the loan;
(3) the lender refrains from specifying any interest rate as such; (4) the
borrower agrees to pay the lender a specified percentage of the profits
from the venture that the borrowed funds are ticketed to finance.43
Depending upon the relative strengths of the parties, the need for funds,
and the desire to lend, these provisions produce an agreement ranging
from a guaranteed return plus profits44 to merely some designated
percentage of income.4 5
Participation by a mortgagee in the profits of the mortgaged property
may assume many forms. Manifestly, there may be provisions for the
lender to take a percentage of the gross income, participate after gross
profits reach a named dollar amount, receive a percentage Of profits
before or after taxes and/or depreciation, or some other scheme combin-
ing these or other factors. Regardless of the form or particular formula
used the test is the same-whether the interest (and or profits) is at risk
40. Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA.
L. REv. 327 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Whittlemore Homes, Inc. v. Fleishman, 190 Cal. App.2d 554, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 235 (1961); Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). But,
compare, Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc., 230 Cal. App.2d 746, 41 Cal. Rptr. 338
(1964).
42. Annot., supra note 12.
43. Comment, The Application of Texas Usury Laws to Equity Participation
Agreements, 48 TEx. L. REv. 925, 928 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
45. See, e.g., Trask v. Hazazer, 4 N.Y.S. 635 (Super. Ct. 1888).
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of loss.4" If interest is contingent, the loan is not usurious unless it
raises the return substantially in excess of the statutory maximum, and
the fixed interest is at or close to the ceiling.47
The general rule just set forth is infinitely easier to state than it is to
apply. It provides for two extremes where the decisions are perfunctori-
ly made and an expansive middle ground where one treads lightly. On
one extreme there is an advance of money without an unconditional
promise to repay. This is not a loan, and consequently not subject to
usury statutes.48 In such a case, the agreement simply calls for a share
of the profits without mention of obligation to repay the advance. This
is an investment. The other extreme occurs where the lender has an
unconditional promise to repay, a provision for interest at the maximum
rate, and a contingent interest in the profits. 49 Almost without excep-
tion the courts will find the loan to be usurious.10
The area of concern is the middle ground. That area in which the
lender has a secured promise of repayment of principal but instead of
interest the agreement provides for some share of expected income, or
some rate of interest below the statutory maximum, plus a share of the
profits. Though no cut-off points can be declared, it can be stated with
certainty that as the guaranteed rate of interest approaches the maxi-
mum, the chances of a court finding a loan usurious increase.
One court has stated the rule as follows: 51
It appears to be the general rule that a plaintiff has established
his case, as applied to a demonstration that the nature of the ob-
ligation contracted was usurious, when his evidence entitles the
fact finder to conclude that the parties contemplated that an amount
exceeding legal interest was to be paid,---or, as to something other
than money to be paid, that the value thereof was not contingent or
speculative and was so palpably in excess of legal interest as to show
,an intent to evade the usury law.5 2
Two Texas cases provide some insight as to the application of this
rule. It should be noted that in neither of these cases was there a
provision for fixed or guaranteed interest. Instead the lender's return
was based solely on the profits of the business. In Beavers v. Taylor,58
46. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hughitt, 75 N.Y. 55 (1879); Riley v. Sears, 154 N.C.
509, 70 S.E.2d 997 (1911); Beavers v. Taylor, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
47. Brown v. Cardoza, 153 P.2d 767 (Cal. 1944); Jameson v. Warren, 267 P.2d 372
(Cal. App. 1928); Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
48. Burton v. Stayner, 182 S.W. 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
49. See, Cases cited at note 47.
50. See, e.g., Edwards v. Johnson, 219 Ky. 113, 292 S.W. 750 (1927).
51. Thompson v. Hague, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
52. Id. at 296 (emphasis in original).
53. See, 434 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
395
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Beavers and his partner, Dyett, borrowed $5,000 from Taylor for their
business. A note was executed and secured by the accounts receivable,
cash and inventory of the partnership. The note provided for "no
interest", and the simultaneous written loan agreements provided the
following: (1) Lender could demand repayment at any time upon a
feeling of insecurity; (2) Borrowers could repay the loan at any time
after one year upon giving 90 days notice; (3) In consideration of the
loan and services rendered borrowers agreed to pay (a) 1% of first
$10,000 gross sales per month; (b) 0.75% of the next $15,000 gross
sales per month; (c) 0.5% of gross sales exceeding $25,000.54 The
evidence showed that Mrs. Taylor never rendered any services, that
Beavers and/or Dyett paid some $12,495 to Taylor, and that this sum
represented an annual rate of 20% .55 The court found that none of the
instruments provided for excessive interest on their faces, and therefore
the transaction did not present a prima facie case of usury. "In such
event the burden is on appellants to show that there existed a device or
subterfuge to charge usury, and that both parties had that purpose in
contemplation at the time of the execution of the contract." '56 The
contract provided for payments of a percentage of gross sales of the
partnership. Had there been no sales, there would have been no
payments forthcoming. The court concluded that the amount of return
on the loan was contingent and uncertain, and the fact that it ultimately
resulted in the lender receiving value in excess of the amount prescribed
by statute did not render the loan usurious even if this was the probable
result. 57
The record does not indicate whether evidence of the partnership's
past performance was offered, but it would certainly seem to be relevant
in determining the degree of risk which the lender incurred. One would
assume that Mrs. Taylor had suffered very little risk if the business had
consistently sold in excess of $75,000-$100,000 per month. On the
other hand, the risk would be substantial if the business were a fledgling
and had no sales history. Apparently, the court was satisfied that
payment was geared to gross sales.
The opposite conclusion was reached in Thompson v. Hague,5
apparently because the income was ascertainable, and thus not as un-
certain. A note was executed for $40,000, free of interest, and payable
in about five years from date of execution. As consideration Hague as-
signed an existent lease of business property to the Thompsons for the
54. Id. at 231.
55. The maximum rate of interest in Texas is 10%. TEx. CONST. Art. XVI, § 11.
56. 434 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
10
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duration of the loan. The revenues from the lease were not to be cred-
ited to the principal but were to be used wholly as consideration of the
loan. Revenues from the lease amounted to $666.67 or about $8,000
per annum. This brought a return on the loan of 20% well above the
legal maximum for Texas. 59 The evidence adduced at trial indicated
that the lenders were aware of the income from the lease and thus it
was within their contemplation to receive a usurious rate of interest.60
The court found that with the knowledge of the value of the rental rev-
enues, the contract to receive such rentals as consideration for a loan
was usurious on its face."'
These cases clearly do not define the limits to which a lender may go
before a loan is condemned as usurious. Probably no case ever will.
Nevertheless, one may readily see what the court means when it
says". . . the parties contemplated that an amount exceeding legal
interest was to be paid. .... ,,12 In Thompson the parties clearly knew
what the rentals were, and they were virtually assured of the rate of
return. On the other hand, in Beavers the record gives no basis upon
which the lender could have contemplated a return. Gross sales could
have varied dramatically with the seasons, the state of the economy, or
the state of the particular industry.
In summary, most profit participation agreements can be structured
to escape a court's finding that a usurious loan is involved. The only
transaction that the lender must avoid is the guaranteed return. The
arrangement must not be such that a particular sum in excess of the rate
allowed is a virtual certainty. Such an adjustment should not prove to
be onerous for the lender if sound business judgment is exercised in
determining the levels and percentages of profit participation.
B. Ownership Participation
In times of a tight mortgage market with corresponding high interest
rates and scarce mortgage money, borrowers have been seeking way to
induce mortgage lenders to part with their funds. One such technique
which has been gaining in popularity is ownership participation. The
borrower actually offers an ownership position for no consideration or
consideration grossly inadequate for the share to be given.63 The
lender's "piece of the action" may take any of the usual business forms
including corporate shareholder, general partner, limited partner, joint
venturer, tenant in common, etc. Lenders find the position advanta-
59. See, note 55 supra.
60. 430 S.W.2d at 295.
61. 430 S.W.2d at 296.
62. Id.
63. Kessing v. National Mtg. Co., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
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geous in many instances. Since they are owners, the lenders will receive
more than simply the profits of the project. If the property appreciates
in value or the business generates goodwill, the lender will be the
beneficiary to the extent of his share of ownership."4 The problem is
that all these techniques of ownership participation have usurious
implications. 65
Because of these implications the courts have been zealous in their
attempt to expose the myriad of devices as subterfuges to evade the
usury statutes. 66 The central question in each case is whether the
transaction was intended as a means of avoiding the usury statutes.6 7 A
North Carolina case provides an interesting example. In Kessing v.
National Mortgage Corp.,6" the plaintiff applied for and received $250,-
000 payable in monthly installments of $500 each with interest at the
rate of 8% per annum, the maximum legal rate.69 The loan was
secured by a first deed of trust on a leasehold interest and a second deed
of trust on an apartment complex. As an additional requirement and
condition for the loan, Mortgage Corporation insisted that Kessing form
a partnership of which Kessing was to be a general partner, and one of
two limited partners with Mortgage Corporation. The partnership
agreement gave Mortgage Corporation a 25% interest in the partner-
ship for its contribution of $25. It was further provided that Mortgage
Corporation should share in 25% of the profits while its liability would
be limited to its contribution of $25. Kessing was also required to
transfer to the partnership the properties used to secure the trust
deeds. 70  At trial the president of Mortgage Corporation testified that
the defendant would not have made the loan for 8 % interest, but that
the equity participation and the conveyances were considerations for
making the loan. He added that with the partnership profits the
defendant expected a return of between 16% and 20% -- certainly over
8%. After finding that the transaction was a loan, the court deter-
mined that it was usurious. 71 In view of the president's testimony, such
a finding was clearly expected. 72
The agreement in Kessing, without the president's testimony, was too
blatant an example of overreaching by the lender to avoid a finding of
64. Comment, Lender Participation in Borrower's Venture: A Scheme to Receive
Usurious Interest, 8 Hous. L. REv. 546 (1970-71).
65. Hershman at 317.
66. See, note 43 supra.
67. Hershman at 317.
68. See, 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. 24-8 (1961).
70. 278 N.C. 523, 526, 180 S.E.2d 823, 825.
71. Id. at 531, 180 S.E.2d at 828.
72. American Insurers Life Ins. Co. v. Regenold, 243 Ark. 906, 423 S.W.2d 551
(1968); Curnette v. Houston, 163 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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usury. It was apparent from the face of the agreement that the purpose
was to provide for excessive interest. Despite this fact, some fear has
been expressed that Kessing spells the "beginning of the end" for equity
participation, at least in North Carolina.7  This fear should be dis-
pelled. Although there have been no later cases in North Carolina
prescribing the limitations of Kessing, it is clear that the well grounded
exceptions to the usury statutes remain undisturbed. 74  In Riley v.
Sears,75 two avenues of escape are articulated, namely the Risk of Loss
Doctrine and the contingency exception. Of the two, the latter appears
to be the more acceptable-at least for institutional lenders.
Riley makes it clear that to come within the ambit of the Risk of Loss
Doctrine the investor must shed all appearances of a lender. He must
incur ". . . Responsibility for ... debts and tak[e] the full risks of the
venture.'7 6 This would exclude a provision for repayment of the sum
advanced and as such would probably be unacceptable for most institu-
tional lenders.77 Private parties may however find that assuming a role
as partner, joint venturer, or stockholder attractive. It would appear
that the investor would have some degree of leverage in bargaining for a
greater share of the business since the investment is not repayable as
such.78 Moreover, as a partner of the venture one could exercise some
control over the decision making process and thus protect the investment
and possibly even enhance the prospects of success. Using Kessing as a
model, Mortgage Corporation might have assumed such a position by
deleting the note and deeds of trust, and by providing for transfer of the
properties to the partnership while taking an interest commensurate
with the value of the investment to the partnership. Under this arrange-
ment, Mortgage Corporation would have put its advance "at risk of
loss" and would have had no promise of its return. Mortgage Corpora-
tion would have been a partner.
The discussion above assumes the omission of a promise to repay the
investment. Assuredly, this is the safest means of avoiding any charge
of usury, but it also places the lender in a position he is usually unwilling
to assume. There are cases, however, which hold that an agreement for
73. Note, Kessings v. National Mortgage Corporation-Is Participation Dead?, 8
WAKE FOR. I. REv. 304 (1971-72).
74. The court in Kessing cited Riley v. Sears, 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911),
with approval, albeit for an element of usury instead of with reference to ownership
agreements.
75. Id. at 518, 70 S.E. at 1000-1001.
76. Id.
77. See, note 64 supra.
78. There are cases which have held that a partnership existed despite a provision
for repayment of the sum advanced. See e.g., Atkinson v. Wileken, 142 Cal. App.2d
246, 298 P.2d 147 (1956); Salter v. Havivi, 30 Misc.2d 251, 251 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1961).
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repayment is not fatal to a claim of joint venture or partnership. In
Atkinson v. Wileken, 79 negotiations resulted in the advance of $4,000 to
the plaintiff, and the execution of a promissory note for $6,000 includ-
ing 6% interest. The note was secured by a third deed of trust on
plaintiff's rental property, and payment was set at $80 per month. The
court found the following facts to exist: plaintiff was in financial
difficulties and had approached the defendant with an offer to sell the
property; defendant, who had some real estate experience, refused the
offer but told plaintiff we would help him save the property and together
they would try to sell it; at the time of the transaction there were two
deeds of trust on the property securing debts amounting to $9,000 of
which the second had a balloon payment of $4,000 which was past due;
defendant advertised the property, showed it to prospective buyers on
several occasions, and performed some repair work; defendant procured
a buyer who offered $17,500 for the property; plaintiff later sold the
property for $23,500 and on defendant's demand, based his one half
profit on the $17,500 offer; and defendant was paid $4,600, whereupon
he released the third deed of trust.80 The court found that the transac-
tion constituted a partnership and was outside the proscriptions of the
usury statute. In responding to the claim that the monthly payments
were evidence of a loan, the court noted that the $80 per month
amounted to about one half of the total rentals or the share to which the
partner was entitled. The court further held that the giving of the note
and third trust deed was but an incidental part of the whole transac-
tion.8'
In analyzing this case one should take particular notice of the work
put forth by the alleged lender.8 2 It was he who advertised the proper-
ty, performed termite preventive work, sought out prospective buyers,
and made repairs. Such activity is not to be passed over lightly for these
are the actions of an owner, not a lender. No doubt these facts weighed
heavily on the judgment of the court.
The same result has been reached in other cases88 where it was shown
that the lender expended some effort in the operation of the enterprise,
i.e. conducted himself in the manner of an owner, rather than in the
manner of a lender. The conclusion to be reached is that a lender may
escape the wrath of the usury statutes while reaping profits in excess of
the maximum rate allowed, and he may enjoy such a position even with
an absolute promise to repay the sum advanced, but to do this, he must
79. 142 Cal. App.2d 246, 298 P.2d 147 (1956).
80. Id. at 248, 298 P.2d at 149.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Salter v. Havivi, 30 Misc.2d 251,.215 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1961); Korth v.
Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1976], Art. 12
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss2/12
EQUITY PARTICIPATION
also make certain efforts not characteristic of a lender. He must show
some interest in the enterprise, an interest which is qualitatively different
from that expressed by an average lender. The immediate reaction is
that lenders will be unwilling or unable to fill the bill. The short answer
is that these are the costs of increased profits.
The other avenue of escape from the usury statutes in regard to
ownership participation is the contingent profit exception. As discussed
in the previous section concerning loan agreements, the contingency
rule excepts from the operation of the usury statutes a given transaction
if it can be shown that the return was "speculative, indefinite, uncertain,
[or] doubtful." 4  "If, however, the amount of probable profits is
estimated in money, and the share the lender is to receive is expressed in
money, and not expressed as a part of the profits nor made contingent
on the earning of such profits the transaction is usurious. ' '81 To fall
within this exception, the lender must make his return contingent upon
the earnings of the enterprise. He can provide for the loan to be repaid,
and he may secure it, but the profits may not be easily ascertainable. A
case in point is Foreman v. Needles.8" It appeared that the three
defendants and one Elliott had purchased a tract of land for develop-
ment and sale as city lots, each to share equally in the net profits of the
venture.8 7 As the work progressed, more funds were needed to contin-
ue the project. Furthermore, Elliott had seemingly had enough of the
venture and wanted to be repaid his contribution and withdraw. More-
over the mortgage on the unpaid balance of the purchase was due.
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff, Foreman, was approached for
a $25,000 loan. Plaintiff made the loan under the following terms: (1)
out of the proceeds of the loan Elliott would be paid and his interest
assigned to plaintiff; (2) the three remaining owners (defendants)
would execute their note, with interest at 10 percent to Foreman,
secured by the tract of land. 8 Some four years later Foreman filed his
petition for foreclosure of the mortgage and judgment against his co-
tenants. They set up the defense of usury claiming that $5,400 of the
$25,000 loan had been used to purchase Elliott's interest for the plain-
tiff, Foreman, and as such constituted a usurious bonus for making the
loan.9 The court answered the charge as follows:
If this agreement had been as stated. . . , and the interest of
Elliot had been secured, or had been transferred to the plaintiff,
without regard to the remaining three-fourths, then it might be that
84. Foreman v. Needles, 78 Okla. 105, 109, 188 P. 1087, 1091 (1920).
85. Riley v. Sears, 154 N.C. 509, 518, 70 S.E. 997, 1000 (1911).
86. 78 Okla. 105, 188 P. 1087 (1920).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 106, 188 P. at 1088.
89. Id. at 107, 188 P. at 1089.
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,the transaction would be usurious; but when the mortgage was eve-
cuted to secure the payment of the $25,000, the plaintiff's one-fourth
was included in the mortgage; in other words, when lots were sold
and the interest paid, plaintiff paid one-fourth of the amount. If the
entire townsite had been sold and only brought sufficient to pay
the amount due plaintiff with the interest thereon, then plaintiff would
have received only 10 percent upon the amount advanced.90
The court then found that the loan was not usurious, noting that the
Elliott interest assigned to plaintiff was "purely speculative, indefinite,
uncertain, and very doubtful."'" The Foreman case is important be-
cause it shows a lender with an unconditional promise to repay, earning
10% interest, and reaping the possible benefit of his ownership
interest. Apparently, the distinguishing fact in this case when com-
pared with Kessing v. National Mortgage Corporation9" is that Foreman
was deemed to have contributed a sum comparable in value to the
interest he received. Also, the court seemed to be dealing with Fore-
man as if he were two separate entities. First, there was Foreman the
lender who simply advanced a sum of money and demanded a fair rate
of interest for its use. Then there was Foreman the investor who was
not entitled to any profits until the lender was paid. This is a view
which lenders should relish. Placing the facts in the context of a
limited partnership, Foreman could not lose. If things went well, he
could enjoy the interest from the loan plus whatever profit there was to
take. On the other hand, if the deal went bad, Foreman the lender
would be secured while, Foreman the partner would be limited in
losses to his one-fourth interest which he would re-coup upon payment
of the loan. An enviable position, if it could be sustained.
The writer is quick to point out that Foreman is not the lone shining
star for lenders. Indeed, there have been a number of cases which have
allowed the lender to specify a rate of interest in addition to profits from
a share of the business.9 To obtain such an enviable position, however,
the lender must make certain adjustments and adaptations. The lender
must be willing to pay a price which approaches the value of the share
taken.94 He must be willing to perform tasks which indicate an interest
in the business that is qualitatively different from that usually displayed
by a lender.9 5 On the other hand, if the agreement specifies a share of
the enterprise in addition to a guaranteed rate of interest, then the rate
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109, 188 P. at 1091.
92. See, 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823.(1971).
93. See, e.g., Thomassen v. Carr, 250 Cal. App.2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967).
94. See, 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
95. See, 142 Cal. App.2d 246, 298 P.2d 147 (1956).
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of interest should not be at or very near to the maximum allowed."
Finally, the profits to be taken from the business should not be easily
ascertainable, as with rents.9 7 Instead, they should be geared to gross
sales, net sales, or the like.
Ownership participation remains a viable alternate in the field of real
estate finance. Surely, there have been setbacks, such as Kessing v.
National Mortgage Corp.,8 but they should be viewed as poor examples
of draftsmanship and overreaching, not the end of equity participation.
If the lender is willing to make some concessions and adaptations, then
there should be little difficulty in avoiding the wrath of the usury
statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Consumer protection in the realm of real estate finance is most
assuredly a desired end, and no doubt the end to which usury statutes
are intended to serve. These statutes have not been serving the consum-
er, however, but rather depriving business of much needed funds. 9
Until revisions are made, equity participation appears to be a viable
alternative. Lenders will have to take on new roles and care must be
taken in drafting the necessary instruments, but it can be done with
substantial benefits to all involved. Lenders have made mistakes
through what appears to be cupidity, but that does not spell the end for
all. The courts are shinply unwilling to countenance blatant overreach-
ing. Where the parties have used some discretion, and it does not
appear that an unfair advantage has been gained, there has been little
reluctance to sustain a transaction as proper. Because of this, equity
participation should enjoy continued use at least until some meaningful
revisions are made in the now antiquated usury laws.' 0
WILLIAM W. REsPRESS, JR.
96. See, 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
97. See, 430 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
98. See, 154 N.C. 509, 70 S.E. 997 (1911).
99. See, note 2 supra.
100. Hershman.
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